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Abstract

External Borrowing by LDCs:

A Survey of Theoretical Issues

This paper surveys a broad range of theoretical issues of
international borrowing and lending with a focus on the effects of
sovereign immunity.

The literature in credit market imperfections

and existing theoretical models of sovereign borrowing provide a
basis for much of the survey.

Several institutional features of LDC

borrowing are discussed heuristically which have not been formally
modelled in the literature.

These parts of the survey are intended

as an agenda for further work.

A brie£ critical review of the

econometric implementation of the theoretical models of sovereign
lending is included.

I am grateful to Willem Buiter and T. Paul Schultz for their many
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this survey.
responsible for all remaining errors or oversights.

I remain solely
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Extern al Borrow ing by LDCs: A Survey of
Theor etical Issues
1.

Introd uction
Inflow s of foreig n capita l have played a role in the growth
of

develo ping region s for severa l centu ries.

Portfo lio lendin g to

develo ping count ries experi enced an extend ed period of expans
ion
during the late ninete enth and early twenti eth centu ries.

Althou gh

lendin g by the OECD countr ies to the LDCs grew steadi ly during
the
1960's , the rapid growth of syndic ated bank loans after 1973
and
resche duling s of the 1980's have recent ly brough t widesp read
attent ion to the role of risk in intern ationa l lendin g.
Intern ationa l credit transa ctions are subjec t to the risks
create d by the sovere ign immun ity of debtor s.

In any settin g,

lender s encou nter proble ms of the enforc eabili ty of contra
cts and of
imper fect inform ation about the chara cteris tics and behav ior
of
borrow ers.

One of the partie s to a contra ct may later find renegi ng

on some of their obliga tions in their best intere sts.

Partie s

subjec t to the same legal jurisd iction s can rely upon the
autho rity
of the state for a degree of enforc ement of contra cts.

Loan

contra cts can incorp orate perform ance requir ement s for debtor
s which
rely on the legal instit ution s of the countr y for fulfill ment
in some
contin gencie s.

Howev er, loans betwee n govern ments or the nation als

of differ ent count ries cannot rely on third party enforc ement
.
Relati onship s betwee n borrow ers and lender s must be self-e nforci
ng.
Contra ctual terms are viable for which fulfill ment is in the
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enlightened self-interest of the debtor.

With the absence of an

external authority to enforce directly contractual obligations and
the protection of debtor assets afforded by sovereignty, the
enforcement of contracts necessarily occurs through the credibility
of indirect sanctions for default.

The interruption of other

transactions, such as, future credit flows and trade agreements,
between creditors and recalcitrant debtors provide the primary means
of enforcement.
Many writers on LDC debt have concentrated on the question of
whether repayment difficulties are the result of a lack of debtor
solvency or liquidity.

In only a few instances, can an argument even

be made that a country's net worth is negative; even if the output
counted includes only that readily transferable to foreigners, the
present value of the stream of resources available for repayment
exceeds the debt of almost all borrowers.

If the current problems

are ones of liquidity, then an explanation is needed of why lenders
fail to provide additional loans to ultimately solvent debtors.

The

theoretical literature on lending with potential repudiation provides
a starting point for modelling this issue.

The ability of debtors to

default on their external obligations implies that credit
transactions are constrained by the proclivity of borrowers to repay,
rather than by their ability.

The amount of debt that is likely to

be voluntarily repaid, under the threat of sanctions, is less than
that which could eventually be serviced.
Lender's imperfect information about the actions and

r
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characteristics of borrowers can lead to major imperfections in the
international credit market.

Asymmetries of information lead to a

variety of moral hazard and adverse selection issues in all credit
transactions (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 and 1983), for example).
In domestic markets, covenants to loan contracts specifying borrower
and lender behavior in various contingencies and legal institutions
establishing bankruptcy procedures reduce many of these problems to a
degree.

In international lending, most loan covenants, for example,

those establishing debt priorities, are not enforceable against a
debtor.

Because the penalties for default are indirect, moral hazard

issues can arise through the ability of borrowers to take actions
which reduce the costs of sanctions or the probability of
penalization.
Short-term contracts may govern long-term debtor-creditor
relationships because they allow frequent renegotiation of the terms
I

of the relationship.

When creditors have a limited ability to

observe and restrain debtors' actions, many possible covenants to
loan contracts specifying debtor behavior in various contingencies
are unenforceable.

The restricted ability of lenders to observe

realizations of debtor income can lead to rescheduling of outstanding
short-term debt.

In one interpretation, rescheduling can be viewed

as an outcome in some contingencies which is anticipated by both
sides of the market; loan terms are rationally expected to be
state-contingent.

Another aspect of rescheduling is the strategic

behavior of debtors and creditors, even when initial loans are made
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under competitive conditions.

The success of lenders to incorporate

private sector loans extended without government guarantees into
rescheduled public debt is evidence of their market power.
This paper is intended to survey those insights that can be
obtained from the theoretical literature on credit market
imperfections, in general, and on lending with sovereign risk, in
particular, for understanding the determinants of portfolio capital
flows to the LDCs.

Several implications of these basic models and of

results from the theory of games for the institutions observed in LDC
borrowing are suggested which have not yet been formally modelled.
Four motives for external borrowing can be distinguished.

If

the value of output is subject to fluctuations, then borrowing to
smooth consumption over time is advantageous when consumers are risk
averse.

Borrowing to finance capital accumulation can allow

investment at a higher rate than otherwise optimal in a country with
marginal productivity of capital exceeding the foreign rate of
interest.

The adjustment of consumption and investment following

exogenous events, such as, terms of trade shifts, can be eased
through foreign borrowing.

Debt can also provide a media of exchange

for international transactions, for example, the use of suppliers'
credits for commodity trade.
The next section discusses optimizing models of the pattern of
borrowing for the first two motives which exclude the possibility of
repudiation.

The implications of imposing a solvency-type budget

constraint are presented.

Problems encountered by studying
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non-optimizing models are also discussed.

The simple motives of

lenders to extend credit beyond that which can be repaid in full with
certainty are discussed.
The third section discusses the enforcement problem in
international credit transactions and the possible sanctions for
default.

The credibility of threatened penalties is also examined.

The points emphasized in this section are made in a variety of other
sources; this exposition is quite similar to that given by Eaton,
Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), where the reader will find elaboration
of many of the issues raised.
The role of informational asymmetries for international credit
transactions is surveyed in the subsequent section.

A simple

stochastic model of borrowing with potential default is presented to
aid the exposition.

The inability of creditors to monitor many of

the actions of debtors and observe realizations of debtor-specific
exogenous events can be related to a number of important market
outcomes.

The dominance of syndicated bank loans over bond debt,

short original maturities of loans, debt-rescheduling, and
reserve-holding behavior of debtors are discussed separately,
although they are interrelated phenomena.

One consequence of

short-maturity structure, credit-rationing, and renegotiation is the
possible procyclical pattern of lending in a consumption-smoothing
framework.

The role of borrowers' reputations in repeated lending

games of incomplete information is also discussed; the co-existence
of bond debt with syndicated bank loans and its apparent informal
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priority is given as an example of the potential insights game theory
may provide.
The sixth section discusses the flight of private capital from
debtor nations.

Capital flight can result from public guarantees of

private sector foreign debt, because foreign asset income usually
escapes the increased taxation of domestic capital earnings implied
by bankruptcies.

The rtext two sections briefly discuss the effects

of select debtor country policies on indebtedness and the possible
implications of deposit insurance and inadequate regulation of
intermediaries in creditor countries, respectively.

The last section

contains a brief review of econometric studies of the determinants of
external credit flows and repayment crises.
2.

Solvency and International Lending
A natural starting point for a description of equilibrium

lending to LDCs are models of external borrowing in the absence of
potential default.

Such models provide insights into the pattern of

borrowing under alternative motives and serve as benchmark case for
the analysis of the effects of external disturbances and domestic
policy choices on the borrowing behavior of households and firms.
number of papers on foreign borrowing use two-period models

1

In

these models, both the principal and interest on debts incurred in
the first period must be repaid by the end of the second period;
therefore, solvency requires that second period income equal or
exceed indebtedness and the debt-service obligation.

In any finite

horizon model, the dynamics of borrowing are determined by the

A
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exogenously set terminal level of debt.

In an infinite horizon

framework, debt principals need never by repaid; rather, the present
value of debt-service payments must exceed the value of the
principal.

The steady-state net external asset position of the

country is endogenously determined by optimization of some objective
function.

The solvency budget constraint requires that the present

value of the stream of future income is not less than the current
indebtedness.
The pattern of borrowing and lending under the consumption
smoothing motive can be examined in the absence of default risk in
either finite or infinite horizon models.

Clarida (1986) studies

optimal borrowing in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model
with stochastic income under the imposition of the constraint that a
debtor is solvent with unit probability.

Borrowing is

countercyclical, and any level of debt which can be serviced given
the equilibrium interest rate is reached with positive probability.
Optimal borrowing by an initially capital-poor country for the
purpose of accumulation has been modelled for one-sector economies by
Bardhan (1967), for the small-country case, and Hamada (1966), in a
two-country model.

Since the domestic marginal productivity of

capital initially exceeds that abroad, an exchange of bonds for
capital leads to an increase in wealth and consumption.

Current

account deficits occur as the capital stock and consumption increase.
In the steady state, the current account is balanced and trade
surpluses cover interest payments on a permanent level of debt.

In
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two-sector economy models, early period current account deficits can
be followed by surpluses for an initially capital-poor country. Engel
and Kletzer (1985a) display such stages in the balance of payments in
an optimal savings model with a tradeable investment good and a
non-tradeable consumable under the usual Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions.
Initially, bonds are traded for capital as resources move to the
traded-goods producing sector.

Thereafter, current account surpluses

occur as resources shift toward the consumption goods producing
industry; the capital stock rises or falls as wealth increases,
depending upon the relative capital-intensi ty of the sectors.

In the

2
. h er a net d e b tor or ere d.i tor.
steady-state, t h e country can be eit
Another literature which emphasizes the ability of debtors to
repay exists.

Domar (1950) presents a simple way in which debt and

debt-service can permanently grow: the growth rate of new lending
must exceed the interest rate (Avramovic (1964) presents a similar
analysis).

Under this scheme, the initial principal is provided in

exchange for nothing.

This line of modelling is adopted by Kharas

(1984) and Sachs (1984) in the context of borrowing in the presence
of constraints on government revenue.

When governments incur

external debts, repayment is constrained by the ability of the
government to raise revenue and transfer it abroad.

In the absence

of lump-sum taxation, deadweight losses and national income are
endogenous to the level of revenue-raising attempted.

In the Kharas

paper, the debtor's growth rate is exogenous and exceeds the interest
rate, so that an equilibrium in international asset markets will fail
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to exist.

The growth rate should be treated as an endogenous

variable.

Sachs (1984) uses a two-period optimizing model with an

exogenously imposed constraint on government revenue in the second
period.

This leads to a higher marginal cost of revenue in that

period and to optimal borrowing up to a point below that which
equates the domestic marginal productivity of capital to the interest
rate.

As Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) emphasize, switching

the period in which the constraint is binding reverses the result.
While equilibrium intertemporal optimizing models only serve as a
benchmark case, models which adopt arbitrary assumptions can lead to
special or untenable conclusions.
Solvency models exogenously impose a constraint on borrowing,
rather than deriving such constraints on the supply of loans from
creditors' optimizing behavior.

In a stochastic income framework,

loans can serve risk-sharing purposes, in addition to providing
intertemporal trades.

If repayment capacity is uncertain, then a

lender generally will lend more than can be repaid in all
contingencies on schedule.

A risk-neutral creditor seeking to

maximize expected profit will extend credit beyond that amount which
can be serviced with certainty.

Jaffee and Modigliani (1969)

deomonstrate that such a lender would place an upper bound on the
amount lent and incur a possibility of ex post losses.
The maximum debt for which a borrower remains solvent may itself
be endogenous because the resources available for repayment can
depend upon repayment obligations.

Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show

10

that the choice of investment can vary with the loan contract taken.
If lenders cannot observe directly the project selection of a
borrower, then adverse selection results in their model.

Increasing

the interest rate increases the riskiness of loans and can lead to a
decrease in expected profits; therefore, credit rationing can result.
An important implication is that solvency cannot be defined
independent ly of the actions of agents on both sides of the market.
A surprisingl y large percentage of the discussion about the
indebtednes s of the LDCs has focussed on the solvency or liquidity of
debtor governments .

The debts of countries are clearly less than the

value of assets owned by governments and nationals in almost all
cases.

While the government may face limits in its ability to

appropriate these assets, this action involves a set of trade-offs
and is a choice taken by the government.

As Gersovitz (1985) points

out, Mexican oil reserves alone (the property of a parastatal)
probably are adequate to cover Mexico's external debt.

The other

popular view is that borrowers have positive net worth but are
illiquid.

Clearly, the question of why are lenders unwilling to

supply new credit arises.
Instead, sovereign governments can elect to default on terms of
a contract or repudiate outright external obligations .
impedes the internation al movement of capital.

This ability

The subsequent

sections discuss the implication s of sovereign risk for modelling
external borrowing by the LDCs.
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3 . .soverei~n Immunity and the Voluntariness of Repayment
Any credit transaction is subject to a potential problem of
enforcement of the terms of the exchange.

Nationals of the same

country who enter into a contract can appeal to the external
authority of the state in, the event of one party's reneging upon an
obligation.

To varying degrees, the legal frameworks of nations

provide protection for parties to a contract in the event of the
inability or unwillingness of one of them to abide by the terms of
the contract.

Contracts written between nationals of one country and

nationals or the government of another, however, are subject to a
potential problem of sovereign immunity.

Generally, creditors have

little or no hope of obtaining compensation for nonperformance in the
debtor's own political and legal jurisdiction.

The sovereignty of

nations rules out the existence of a credible third party to enforce
terms of contracts involving governments.

Therefore, many

international credit transactions can involve only contract terms
which would be in the best interests~ post of the borrower to
honor.

Many of the institutions surrounding international lending

can be understood best in terms of this need for contracts to be
self-enforcing.

The primary impediment to international capital

flows to the LDCs is not seen in the ability of countries to repay,
but instead in the voluntariness of fulfilling contract obligations.
The major difference between international and domestic credit
contracts is that the latter are legal obligations which are subject
to enforcement under the power of the state.

Debtors who are unable
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to repay may file for bankruptcy, obtain protection from creditors
and discharge of their obligations.

Because repayment of external

debt is largely voluntary, so that the penalties which can be imposed
on a recalcitrant debtor country necessarily are indirect.

A nation

may suffer the consequences of incurring debt-service obligations it
cannot service for an arbitrary period of time.

Furthermore, while

collateral plays a significant role in domestic lending, it plays
virtually no role in international credit markets.

Collateral

remaining in the debtor country cannot be seized, and physical assets
outside the country are often of little productive value (the
exceptions tend to comprise value far less than outstanding debts of
the LDCs).
In any context, a loan is a particular form of contract between
parties governing an intertemporal exchange.

The contract specifies

repayment terms and actions which may be taken by debtors and
creditors in a variety of contingencies.

The possibility that

repayment obligations may not be met as contracted is reflected in
the covenants of the loan contract.

These covenants are intended to

ensure that the borrower engage in certain activities and not engage
in others which affect the likelihood of full repayment.

Contracts

also specify conditions under which the lender can suspend terms.of
the contract prior to its expiration (in LDC lending, cross-default
clauses serve this purpose).
Loan covenants are useful only if the contingencies to which
they apply and debtor's actions they stipulate are observable by the
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lenders.

A crucial determinant of the nature of the relationship

between lender and borrower is the set of actions and outcomes that
are observable by both and upon which covenants can be written.

Debt

contracts specify an amount to be lent and a schedule of repayments
of interest and principal to be made, but these are, to varying
degrees, state-contingent terms.

The degree to which observability

is incomplete affects the extent that debtor-creditor relationships
are governed by explicit and by implicit contracts.

The lesser is

the ability of creditors to restrain the actions of debtors during a
contract's term, the greater is the incentive to offer short-term
agreements in long-term credit relationships.

Short-term loans allow

for frequent recontracting of the terms of the agreements, therefore,
a finer degree of conditioning on borrowers' actions.
The role of repetition of the relationship between borrower and
lender should not be ignored.

In a two-period framework, a borrower

can either provide full repayment of a loan at the second date or
default.

A default is merely a payment of anything less than the

principal plus agreed upon interest.

In a multi-period setting,

deviations from a repayment schedule do not necessarily imply that
future payments will not maintain the present value of the loan.
When credit relationships potentially last a number of periods,
contracts may be renegotiated and entered into under full recognition
of this possibility.

A variety of responses by creditors to

violations of the terms of the agreement are possible.

As Eaton,

Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) point out, declaration of a default is
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only one of these.

They define a default as occurring whenever a

creditor formally declares that there has been a violation of a
condition of the loan.

The contract conveys upon the lender the

right to declare a borrower in default; creditors may or may not
choose to exercise this right.

Therefore, default is the result of a

sequence of decisions, not an automatic outcome.

Insolvency of a

debtor is not an adequate condition for the declaration of a default;
the lender may lose the ability to obtain partial repayment by doing
so.

On the other hand, a default may be declared when a borrower has

positive net worth.

For example, declaration can follow the

unwillingness of the debtor to repay other loans or the inability of
the creditor to restrict actions of the borrower which increase the
riskiness of outstanding debt.

Formal declaration of a default in

international lending can result in costly actions by regulators for
both lenders and borrowers.

The imposition of penalties by other

governments on countries in default will tend to lower the expected
flow of payments to existing creditors, even if anticipated payments
fall below the amount lent in present value.
Penalization of Default
The willingness of sovereign debtors to abide by the terms of
loan contracts depends upon the degree to which default can be
penalized and the resolve of lenders to impose penalties.

The

penalties available to creditors include exclusion from future access
to credit, interference with commodity trade, and disruption of
access to trade finance.

In the nineteenth century, military threats
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against debtor nations and even the loss of sovereignty (Egypt)
appear to have been credible threats.

The suspension of favorable

trade agreements, for example, revoking and granting to alternate
suppliers voluntary quota arrangements, are probably credible
contemporary threats along with embargoes on future lending.

The

nature of penalties is crucial to informative modelling of the
international credit market, since the extent of capital flows to the
LDCs depends upon the credibility of borrowers' willingness to repay.
Kaletsky (1985) provides a comprehensive overview of the legal,
political, and institutional issues involved in penalization of
default.

Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b) review U.S. legislation which

provides for potential penalties to be imposed in the event of
default on foreign obligations to the U.S. government or
intermediaries.
Exclusion from future credit access is an often cited potential
penalty (the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) and Kletzer (1984) models
adopt this penalty structure).

A denial of future credit access only

makes sense in an infinite (or equivalently, uncertain) horizon
model, since in a finite horizon setting, the penalty has no force in
the last period.

Therefore, no loans are made in the next to last,

and the penalty has no force in that period as well.
is unsustainable.

A loan market

Similarly, moratoria on future lending are

inadequate penalties to maintain loan transactions if a date will be
reached after which the debtor only makes positive net payments.
the standard infinite horizon optimal capital accumulation models,

In
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such a point is attained when the marginal productivity of capital is
drawn into equality with the interest rate.

As the capital stock

grows, the potential cost of the penalty declines toward zero.

In

this context, exclusion from the credit market is an insufficient
penalty to support any credit transactions by backward recursion.
Furthermore, moratoria on credit access provide an adequate
penalty to sustain lending only in infinite horizon models with
stochastic debtor income.

In this context, future flow of funds is

in both directions so that the penalty can impose a cost on the
debtor in any time period.

If borrowers are risk averse, then the

desire to borrow and the cost of moratoria derives from a motive to
smooth consumption.

Risk-neutrality on the part of lenders assures

that some degree of lending will occur.

In a capital accumulation

model with stochastic output, the threatened denial of future credit
can sustain lending for the purpose of investment if the borrower is
risk-averse, since there is a cost to repudiation in the long run.
However, the flow of capital to the country will be constrained by
the extent of the penalty, so that, generally, the expected marginal
productivity of capital will exceed the interest rate for extended
periods.
In the Eaton and Gersovitz and Kletzer models, increases in the
cost of losing access to credit shift outward the supply schedule of
loans.

The penalty for default is higher the lower the rate of

discount, greater the borrower's degree of risk aversion, greater the
variance in income, lower the interest rate, and more costly are
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domestically available avenues for consumption smoothing.

Increasing

the penalty raises the amount lent in these models which benefits the
borrower.

However, since output is stochastic, risk-neutral lenders

will extend credit to a point where default occurs with positive
probability.

In these states, debtors are worse off, and the states

of default are less probable reducing the insurance benefits of
potential default for the borrowers.

Therefore, the expected utility

of debtors can either increase or decrease.
An important role of international lending is in the financing
of international trade.

The cost of conducting barter trade is

presumed widely to be quite high.

Threatened trade embargoes or

suspension of trade preferences can also provide incentives against
debt repudiation.
A set of issues can arise in applying penalties if the actions
of a borrower affect the burden of sanctions.

Committment to actions

which lenders perceive as raising the burden will improve the supply
of credit, and conversely.

However, such actions must be observable

by lenders and not easily reversed.
The potential disruption of trade finance can be partially
offset.

Debtors have an incentive to accumulate foreign reserves in

anticipation of a default, instead of fully meeting their
debt-service obligations.

At the same time, forestalling a

declaration of default by creditors allows the time required for this
accumulation.

Many people may see the 1986 Peruvian limitation of

private market debt-service payments and maintenance of service on
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official (non-IMF) credits, while foreign reserves rose, in these
terms.

The efficacy of the penalty may be diminished because a

default declaration is not currently in the creditors' interests.
Penalization of a recalcitrant debtor through disruption of its
international trade may be quite credible.

If a debtor attempts to

transact trade through banks on which it has defaulted, then any
transactions balances can be attached to cover its debt obligations.
Avoidance of the international banking system can significantly
increase the cost of trading.

Although punishment of a defaulter

will often not increase the likelihood of ultimate repayment, a
lender can credibly threaten to offset loan obligations against other
balances of a non-performing borrower.
Gersovitz (1983) and Alexander (1985) study models in which the
penalty for default depends positively upon the importance of trade
to the debtor.

A committment to raise investment leads to an

increase in the supply of credit if it increases the value of trading
opportunities.

If investment occurs in import-substitu ting

industries, then it reduces the repayment incentive.
A number of papers (Sachs (1984), Cooper and Sachs (1985), and
Sachs and Cohen (1985)) assume that the penalty for default is a loss
of income proportional to GNP.

Among the conclusions they derive is

the implication that if a credit-constrai ned debtor can commit funds
to investment, instead of to consumption, then the supply of credit
will expand.

As Gersovitz (1985) makes clear, this conclusion easily

fails to hold in models adopting penalties of credit or trade
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embargoes.

Also, a reasonable argument can be given that the higher

a debtor's income, the more able it will be to accomodate itself to
sanctions.

The Credibility of Embargoes in Future Lending
While governments and banks may reasonably be expected to reduce
a country's trading opportuniti es in the event of a default,
threatened moratoria on future credit access may not always be
credible.

Current creditors or other potential lenders may find

continued flows of credit to a recalcitran t borrower profitable.

In

particular, the full suspension of future borrowing possibiliti es
will not increase the probability of even partial repayment of old
debt.
In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a), lenders are competitive so that
any loan earns zero profit.

They argue that, therefore, the costs of

refraining from future lending are also zero.

However, this

equilibrium can be difficult to support under non-coopera tive
behavior amongst lenders.

If all other creditors refrain from

lending in the future to a defaulter, then any particular lender can
provide a profitable loan.

A cooperative outcome can arise in the

infinite horizon case when borrowers' and lenders' identities are
subject to recall by the other players in the repeated game.

A

player who fails to cooperate at one point (e.g. by defaulting) will
face non-coopera tive strategies chosen by the other players for some
number of subsequent plays.

The literature on repeated

20

non-cooperative games can be appealed to for a nwnber of results,
notably when discount rates are small, a degree of cooperation can
emerge in equilibriwn (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)).
The entry of new lenders during a moratoriwn on credit access
enforced by old creditors can be restricted in repeated game models
with imperfect information.

The refusal of current creditors to lend

may easily convey information to other potential creditors in this
context.

Also, the relatively small nwnber of international banks

may be capable of cooperating in the exclusion of defaulters.

The

banks themselves may be able to enforce an embargo through their
other transactions with each other.

The syndication of bank loans to

the LDCs may be seen partly as a response to the need to credibly
impose sanctions for default.

Additionally, a current lender faces

the possibility of recovering previous loans if it makes new loans to
a debtor having repayment difficulties.

Therefore, new lenders may

have less to gain by negotiating loans to a problem debtor than do
existing creditors.
Another possibility is that creditors can write covenants in
loan contracts which pertain to other creditors' actions.

These

provisions, particularly seniority clauses, could be enforced in
developed country courts to which both lenders are subject.
Covenants of this type allow a creditor to obtain an enforceable
judgment against another creditor in a common legal jurisdiction
rather than attempt to enforce a contract with a sovereign borrower.
Cross-default and seniority clauses in IMF and World Bank loan

3
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agreements may also lend credibility to sanctions.

Stiglitz and

Weiss (1983) discuss the potential incentive effects of debt senioity
clauses and show that a refusal of a current creditor to lend leads
to refusals of new lenders as well.
Eaton (1985) emphasizes the importance of banks' reputations for
punishing defaulters in maintaining the value of their equity.
Owners of intermediaries are concerned with preserving their equity
investments, and the failure to punish defaulting debtors causes this
equity to lose its value.

Eaton shows that the value of the equity

must exceed the costs of penalizing borrowers.

Therefore, if

punishment is costly, banks' profits must be positive.

This

mechanism leads to a credible threat of punishment in an infinitely
repeated game and to a lending rate of interest exceeding the deposit
rate even if defaults never occur (e.g. in a non-stochastic model).
The difficulty for a lender to credibly commit to a cutoff of
credit to debtors is demonstrated by Hellwig (1977).

In his model,

lenders extend a line of credit to a borrower with income following a
simple hazard process.

The borrower's income is zero until it jumps

to a permanent positive level; the probability of the jump is the
same each period.

Default occurs if before the jump has occurred,

the credit ceiling is reached and no new credit is forthcoming.

The

lender always has an incentive to increase the credit line if it is
exhausted prior to the increase in income.

Otherwise, no repayment

takes place, while new loans embody the possibility of servicing of
old debt as well.

The new loans need not be profitable if viewed on
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their own, and good money is thrown after bad.

Debtors have the

incentive to increase their consumption in zero income periods,
running down their credit lines rapidly.

Therefore, by making an

initial loan, a creditor enters a relationship in which additional
loans may be profitably written but the total debt provides negative
expected profits.

Consequently, the loan market breaks down.

4. Institutional Characteristics of LDC Borrowing
The necessity for lenders to rely upon the enlightened
self-interest of sovereign borrowers for repayment can be related to
the characteristics which distinguish international credit markets
from domestic ones in the developed countries.

Informational

imperfections may be responsible for many of the market outcomes and
institutions surrounding capital flows to the LDCs.

The inability of

creditors to observe certain actions taken by debtors and outcomes
leads to restrictions on the types of contracts which can be
enforced, hence entered into.

The domination of syndicated bank

lending over bond lending, short maturity lending in long term
debtor-creditor relationships, and rescheduling of debts can be seen
as outcomes of the enforceability problem in sovereign lending.
In this section, a basic model of borrowing with potential
repudiation is presented in which debtor income is stochastic.

The

model makes a number of overly simplifying assumptions and is
intended to serve only for drawing a few basic implications for
modelling and serve as an aid to expositing the role of imperfect
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information in the loan market.
4.1 Basic Stochastic Model
The simple model adopted is a variant of the Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981a) one, following Kletzer (1984).

Output is a random variable,

which is identically independently distributed across periods.
Debtors obtain utility from a discounted stream of felicity (current
period utility) of consumption each period and face a moratorium on
future lending if they default.

Utility is given by,
00

V = E

~
t=O

fit U(c ),
t

where O < fi < 1 and E(.) is the expectation operator.
Output cannot be stored, and, for simplicity, the moratoria last
forever.
In the event of debt repayment, a borrower's utility is,

and, if default is chosen,

where R is the debt-service obligation, and y is output, a random
variable.
d
r
The borrower defaults whenever V (yt) > V (yt,Rt).

The model assumes

that default or full-repayment are the only options available to a
debtor.
If loans mature in one period, then the expected profits to
lenders are given by
E~ = l•(P·(l+r) - (l+p)),
where pis the opportunity cost of funds and rand£ are the interest
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rate and size of the debt.

Pis the probability of repayment which

depends upon the terms of the current and anticipated future loan
contracts.

Kletzer (1984) shows that if the range of possible values

for output is bounded and felicity is concave, then the probability
of default increases with the interest rate and, eventually, with the
amount lent.

Expected profits fall below zero for any interest rate

as the principal passes beyond an upper bound and for any positive
principal as the interest rises beyond a finite bound.

Therefore,

the set of positive loan contracts which provide non-negative
expected profits is bounded in both the amount lent and the rate of
interest charged.

These results are depicted in Figure 1, where

continuity of the cumulative distribution of output and some
additional degree of concavity have been assumed.

The set of loan

contracts in Figure 1 are those available to a particular debtor.
Lenders may be assumed to be risk neutral.
of equilibrium must be explicitly adopted.

However, a concept

Competition amongst

lenders is a useful starting point for examining market outcomes.

In

this model, free entry in loan contracts (interest rates and quantity
lent) is a natural characterization of perfect competition.

If there

are no asymmetries of information between lenders, then it is
appropriate to examine Nash equilibria in loan contracts.

In this

model, a Nash equilibrium in loan contracts is simply the best pair
of interest rate and amount lent for the borrower from amongst those
loan contracts which provide non-negative expected profits.
An important point is that the probability of repayment depends
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upon total debt-servic e obligations , so that the amount any
particular lender will provide in equilibrium depends upon the amount
lent by others.

A Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium with free entry

in loan contracts if each creditor can observe the amount lent by
others.

In equilibrium , a contract must specify the interest rate

and total concurrent amount lent to the borrower from all sources.
Such contracts are enforceable only if the total debt service
obligations at each date are observable by each creditor. 4

With

general maturities of loans, contracts will need to specify the
repayment schedule as a function of the stream of total debt-servic e
obligations of the borrower at each date when a repayment is to
occur.
A Nash equilibrium in loan contracts is depicted in Figure 1,
taken from Kletzer (1984).

The concave curve, EV, passing through

the equilibrium point, A, is an indifferenc e curve for the debtor
(constant expected utility given optimal default behavior).

The loan

demand curve, denoted id, gives the amount of credit which would be
desired at each given rate of interest.

In the presence of possible

default, borrowers demand more credit than they would in its absence.
For this consumption smoothing model, the indifferenc e curves and
curve 1

d

all vary with the realization of income, y.

A smaller (that

is, lower amount and interest rate) debt contract will be chosen with
higher realized output.
The first implication that can be drawn from this model is that
in an equilibrium with observabili ty of total indebtednes s, credit

r

(a)

r

'EV

(b)

Figure 1
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must be rationed.

The contract equilibrium can be supported using a

non-linear interest schedule, that is, the interest rate as a given
function of total concurrent indebtedness.

However, the borrower

cannot obtain all the credit demanded at the equilibrium rate of
interest.

This is the same type of credit-rationing demonstrated by

5
Jaffee and Russell (1976) .
The main point to be made here is that the terms of the loan
contract are simultaneously determined.

The interest rate and amount

lent are both endogenous; the information of lenders which determines
loan supply also determines the interest spread over the opportunity
rate of interest.

This point has been ignored in empirical studies

6
of LDC credit flows .
Furthermore, the interest spread cannot be interpreted in terms
of a risk premium.

For example, an increase in the borrower's

discount rate reduces the penalty for default and leads to a
contraction of the set of loan contracts which provide creditors with
non-negative expected profits.

l

The resulting equilibrium loan

I.

contract can be shown to entail a reduction in the amount lent (more
severely rationed credit, since the demand curve shifts outward with
the increase in default probability for constant contracts) and
either an increase or decrease in the interest rate charged.
risk of default is reflected in both terms of loan contracts.

The
In the

presence of equilibrium rationing, reductions in the amount lent
reflect increases in risk; because the probability of default
declines with decreases in the interest spread, the change in the

27

spread is ambiguous.
An increase in the opportunity cost of capital to lenders or
adverse shifts in the distribution of borrowers' incomes lead to a
shrinkage of the set of loan contracts attaining non-negative
expected profits.

Because the set is bounded for principal amounts

exceeding zero, combinations of given opportunity cost and low ranges
of possible income can yield no positive profitable contracts.

This

may be seen as the source of exclusion of the low-income LDCs from
the private external loan market.
4.2 Syndicated Bank Lending
One of the prominent institutional features of recent LDC
borrowing has been the predominance of bank over bond lending,
particularly through syndicated loans.

Banks may be more able to

enforce and monitor terms of loan contracts than bondholders.

For

example, the ability of banks to enforce seniority clauses and other
covenants (such as cross-default clauses) between each other enhances
their abilities to impose penalties upon reluctant debtors and
renegotiate loan terms.

Bondholders may be unable to agree upon

terms of loan renegotiation because of their diverse interests or
face significant transactions costs in doing so.

While the value of

bonds fluctuate on the secondary market varying the return to
lenders, debtors may face only two options: continued full
debt-service or default.

Syndicated bank debt can be renegotiated

changing both the value of the lenders' assets and the repayment
obligations of borrowers.

In the presence of sovereign immunity and
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indirect enforceability, the ability of syndicates to reschedule loan
payments through cooperation between creditors can give an advantage
to bank over bond lending.
Another important point is that the credit-rationin g equilibrium
described above requires that lenders can observe, therefore
condition loan terms upon, the total concurrent debt-service
obligations of their borrowers.

Restricting total lending, when the

priority of debt is unclear, requires cooperation between lenders.
This may be costly in the case of bondholders and fairly easy to do
through syndication.

An example of an equilibrium notion suitable to

the case of non-observabil ity of total indebtedness by creditors is a
interest-rate taking free entry equilibrium in the model of Figure 1.
Such an equilibrium, if one exists, will result in a contract on the
borrower's loan demand curve at its lowest intersection with the set
of zero expected,profi t loan contracts (point Bin Figure la).
Contracts along the demand curve above this point will be dominated,
for the borrower, by this contract.

In general , such equilibria may

fail to exist (in Figure lb, id does not intersect the set of zero
expected profit contracts).

If this type of equilibrium exists, then

the debtor is always at least as well off in the Nash equilibrium
with observed total indebtedness 7 .
Syndicated bank loans may dominate LDC borrowing because of this
potential asymmetry of information between lenders and each borrower.
The ability of creditors to monitor total concurrent debt-service
obligations has social value in this model.

Because providing
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additional loans raises the probability of default on all debt,
lenders have an incentive to form a syndicate through which they can
correctly observe the total lending by other members.

A guarantee

that an initial sale of bonds (at the Nash equilibrium level) will
not be expanded subsequently is not credible in this model.
Investment banks may or may not be able to credibly restrict bond
issues they register through the equity value of their reputations.
There are incentives to increase indebtedness ex post selling new
bonds with higher yields.
4.3

Debt Maturities
The basic model above (as in Eaton and Gersovitz (198la))

assumes loan principals and interest payments are due after one
period.

Incentives to borrow using longer maturities are common, for

example, gestation lags or investment costs with non-concavities in
production may exist.

In the simple repay-default framework, the

accumulation of additional debt while paying debt-service without
retiring principals on old debt generally will be an attractive
option to debtors.

In the consumption smoothing model without

default, there would be no reason for particular debt-maturities to
appear.

However, the insurance aspects of the option of defaulting

provide incentives for borrowers to prefer longer maturity debt
contracts.
An important aspect of sovereign risk is the inability to
enforce many bond covenants common to domestic capital markets.
Covenants restricting debt-dilution and establishing debt priorities
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are essential to the use of long term loan contracts.

Because

increased lending reduces the profitability of current debt in the
moral hazard model, long-term loans must anticipate possible
subsequent additions to debt.

New loans will be made which require

concurrent debt-service with long-term loans if they are profitable.
Because new lenders may possess more information than was available
when an old contract was made in a stochastic framework, additional
debt will often be profitable.

The increase in debt which occurs

with positive events (e.g. information that reveals an increase in
the~ ante probability of repayment) reduces the ex ante
profitability of a given long-term loan contract.

If additional

shorter-term loans are expected profitable, then with free entry of
lenders, both new creditors and the current providers of long term
debt have the same incentive to make such loans.

Therefore,

covenants restraining additional future borrowing cannot be credibly
enforced in this setting.
Sachs and Cohen (1985) argue that the interest spread on
longer-term debt must rise as a consequence and that this can lead
borrowers to choose shorter-term lower interest rate contracts.
However, debtors may prefer longer-term contracts with higher
interest rates and lower probabilities of full repayment, if they are
offered, due to the insurance roles of long term debt.

Kletzer

(1984) points out that since the set of loan contracts which provide
non-negative expected profits is bounded from above in the interest
rate, the entire set of loan contracts which will be offered shrinks
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with increasing maturities if information about ultimate outcomes is
revealed over time.

This implies that for maturities beyond some

length, there may be no contract with a positive principal that
creditors will offer.

In a stochastic setting, only short and medium

original term debt may be offered.
While many motives for long-term debtor-creditor relationships
exist, transactions may take place only through a sequence of
short-term contracts because lenders are unable to observe and,
therefore, restrain subsequent actions by borrowers.

The lack of

enforceability of debt-dilution and seniority clauses are only a
single cause; a variety of moral hazard and adverse selection
problems may also give rise to short-term debt obligations.

For

example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrate that borrowers'
choices amongst risky projects depends upon the terms of loan
contracts and is subject to adverse selection from the creditors'
viewpoint.

In the presence of asymmetries of information between

debtor and creditor, the ability to change the terms of a
relationship with greater frequency will be valuable.

Contracts

cannot rely on covenants which are not credibly enforceable; periodic
renegotiation of the terms of the relationship provides incentives
for performance on the part of debtor which long-term contracts may
be incapable of achieving due to imperfect information.
4.4

Debt Rescheduling
In the simple stochastic Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) type model

of lending with potential repudiation, creditors have an incentive to
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renegotiate contract terms ex post when borrowers prefer default to
Since the original interest rate exceeds the

full repayment.

opportunity cost of funds, creditors can still realize positive
profits ex post for some reductions of repayment obligations, while
incurring smaller losses in other instances than they would suffer by
declaring a default.

Likewise, debtors will prefer to pay something

less than originally contracted and avoid the penalties consequent
with default.

When creditors possess complete information about

debtors, debt-equity type contracts should emerge which allow, either
explicitly or implicitly, for varying repayment obligations with the
realized state of nature.

Grossman and Van Huyck (1985) take this

approach to interpreting debt-rescheduling.

They suggest that since

the conventional explicit legal contract only specifies a given rate
of interest (which may float), lenders cannot increase the
debt-service obligation prior to the contracted repayment date.
Therefore, the set repayment schedule is the maximum of payments over
states of nature.

Lenders expect to receive less in many outcomes,

and a default only occurs if the payment is less than the anticipated
acceptable one for a given realized outcome.

In the presence of

sovereign immunity and credible penalties for outright repudiation,
the basic model of this section can be used to show that risk-neutral
lenders do not fully insure, that is, entirely smooth the consumption
streams of, borrowers.

Equity-debt contracts specifying

state-contingent repayment obligations will be rationed in
equilibrium.
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If the income realizations of debtors can be observed by
creditors, then loan contracts explicitly specifying state-contingent
payments would arise.

However, the standard debt-contract has been

shown to be the optimal form of incentive-compatible contract for
lending in two-period models when the state of nature can be observed
only at a cost by the creditor (see Townsend (1978); also Gale and
Hellwig (1985)).

Costly observation of the realized income of

debtors in a multi-period model with potential default could generate
equilibrium standard debt contracts with renegotiation.

The

combination of the ability of borrowers to default and indirectness
of penalties imply that equilibrium contracts will be of shorter
original maturity than developed country corporate debt contracts and
entail anticipated potential renegot{ation of repayment terms when
outcomes can be observed, but only at a cost, by creditors.

This is

one interpretation of debt-rescheduling.
The presence of creditors' incomplete information about debtors'
characteristics can significantly affect the nature of
debt-renegotiations.

For example, lenders may be uncertain about the

perceptions of borrowers of the costs of default penalization or the
probability of particular sanctions being imposed.

Even if lenders

cannot observe the realized state of nature, debt-rescheduling could
still take place.

Debtors can be inhibited from persistently

reporting poor outcomes because of the loss of reputation and
deterioration of loan terms that result.

Similarly, cooperation

between lenders can arise, so that only certain types of arrangements
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result, such as a lack of individual debt renegotiation in favor of
simultaneous rescheduling of all outstanding debt.
Debt renegotiations in which debtors seek to obtain new net
capital inflows and those in which they desire to lengthen the
horizon over which principals are repaid or reduce interest
obligations can lead to basically different outcomes.

Most recent

reschedulings have involved debt-service postponement by countries
attempting to reduce their external indebtedness; net payments are
made to creditors, which are smaller than required by the original
contracts.
In the simple stochastic model of borrowing with potential
repudiation, new lenders will only assume debt which assures
non-negative expected profits.

When a debtor realizes a poor output

state, default with consequent penalization can be superior to full
repayment and selection of a new zero expected profit debt contract.
In this case, old creditors have an incentive to reduce debt-service
obligations so that the borrower will choose not to default.

If a

debtor does not desire new inflows of capital, rescheduling results
in a reduction in the present-value of the stream of repayments.
When a debtor seeks a new net inflow of funds, old creditors are
more likely to supply them.

Existing creditors have the possibility

of recovering old debt-service in addition to new repayments when
they provide new loans.

In a low income state, a borrower will

choose between full default with penalization and accepting a
renegotiated debt contract offered by existing creditors.

Because
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new lenders will not assume the old debts on terms which the borrower
would accept (full repayment in this event is inferior to default),
old lenders can offer a rescheduling of existing debt-service
combined with new loans with repayment terms exceeding those
available in the competitive market.

New lenders may be willing to

extend more favorable terms on new inflows if the old debts are
rescheduled, but existing creditors can offer the rescheduling and
new loans as a single take-it or leave-it package.

Even if the

original loans were made in a competitive market (that is, with free
entry in contracts), debt-renegotiat ion involves strategic behavior
on the part of both lenders and borrowers.
Ozler (1984) presents a simple model of bilateral monopoly
between lender and borrower.

When the loan is made, second-period

income and the penalty cost are both uncertain, but the borrower is
known to be solvent.

If income and penalty both exceed debt-service,

then the debtor repays as contracted.

If income falls below the

repayment obligation, then the debtor seeks a rescheduling of
debt-service.

The new loan is made on more favorable terms for the

lender than the initial loan because of the monopoly power the lender
now has.

On the other hand, if the penalty falls below the

debt-service obligation, then the borrower threatens default and
extracts concessionary terms from the lender.

Ozler examines the

effects of rescheduling announcements on the equity value of banks
and finds that reschedulings during the late 1970's increased bank
market values while those during the early l980's reduced them.
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Of course, other explanations of rescheduling exist.

Banks may

agree to postpone debt-service for insolvent or recalcitrant
borrowers because managers are wrong about a debtor's proclivity or
ability to repay, acting in the best interests of their own careers
and moving on, acting in shareholders' best interests by postponing
costs regulators will impose, or hoping that official and
multilateral agency creditors will take over portions of the debt.
Potential problems for lending can be created by the short-term
nature of original loans in the presence of potential default and
consequent credit-rationing.

If the simple model of borrowing is

extended to allow more general stochastic income processes (other
than identically independently distributed ones), then low income
states can lead to reductions in the amount of debt lenders wish to
hold.

For example, when output realizations are positively serially

correlated and debt matures in one period, the set of loan contracts
providing non-negative expected profits shrinks inward in low-income
states.

Because original maturities are shortened for reasons of

imperfect information, lending becomes procyclic in the
consumption-smoothing framework.

Net principal retirements are

desired by creditors when income is low and additions to debt
forthcoming when income is high.

Besides providing a reason in

addition to borrowing for investment for the observed strongly
procyclical pattern of lending to LDCs, this model could provide a
basis for depicting panics amongst lenders.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) present a game model of bank runs.
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Each depositor is better off withdrawing funds if others do so, but
everybody benefits if nobody withdraws their deposits.

Essential to

the result is the assumption that deposits are refunded in full on a
first-come, first-served basis.

When lenders wish to hold fewer

assets in a country, the net payments required rise (at the same time
the value of output falls) which raises the probability of default.
As one creditor withdraws, the profitability of others' loans are
adversely affected.

Without well-defined debt seniorities, this

could potentially lead to a crisis.
Sachs (1984) and Krugman (1985) suggest models similar to
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), substituting syndicated bank loans for
bank deposits and allowing current income to fall short of
debt-service obligations.

Sachs assumes that each bank faces an

upward-sloping marginal cost curve of loans; banking regulations or
risk-aversion are cited as possible sources.

This implies that a

single creditor may find extending the entire loan to avoid default
unprofitable.

Because the refusal of one creditor to relend raises

the probability of default on other loans of other creditors, an
externality exists so that cooperation between lenders can lead to a
superior outcome.

However, as already noted, a new loan need not be

expected profitable on its own to be offered by an existing creditor.
The bank already holding the largest amount of debt will be most
willing to extend further credit.
Gersovitz (1985) points out that both the Sachs and Krugman
models really explain the prorating of payments moratoria and
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reschedulings across lenders and not rescheduling itself.

In the

Diamond and Dybvig model, intermediaries are unable to recoup the
full value of their investments after one period, but depositors are
able to claim the full value of their deposits on a first-come,
first-served basis so that a depositor panic can result.

A sovereign

debtor for which resources available for repayment fall below
debt-service obligations has an incentive to unilaterally reschedule
payments, proportionally revaluing the assets of creditors.

If

creditors all face the same increasing marginal cost of funds, then
debtors will each minimize their losses by accepting partial
proportional payments if a debtor is incapable of servicing the
complete debt.

A lender panic does not occur for the same type of

reason runs on mutual funds do not occur.
4.5

Debt and Reserve-Holdin~
Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) present an interesting empirical

finding: foreign reserves rise as debtor countries are rationed more
severely on international credit markets.

Reserve-holding by debtors

can be justified by the same transactions cost arguments that serve
for creditors.

However, credit market imperfections and default

sanctions can be identified as additional sources of motives for
reserve-holding and help explain the pattern of reserve accumulation
by borrowers.
The difficulty encountered in explaining reserve holding by
debtors in the absence of transactions costs is that the interest
paid on debt should equal or exceed that earned on reserves.

We have
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already argued that short original debt maturities in a model of
credit-rationing under potential repudiation with a general
stochastic income process can lead to a procyclical pattern of
lending (which happens to be socially inefficient).

The supply curve

of credit shifts inward with low income realizations, so that the
cost of credit increases and eventually becomes infinite.

The gap

between the marginal borrowing rate of interest and the discount rate
during low income events can compensate for the gap between the
interest rate on debt (or, more generally, the marginal productivity
of domestic capital) and the interest earned on reserves.

This

motive for further consumption-smoothing through saving in the form
of reserves derives from the presence of a credit constraint.

In

general terms, uncertainty about the future marginal rate of
substitution of consumption between periods and the future marginal
cost of borrowing leads to the holding of precautionary reserves.
The imperfection in credit markets creates the insurance role for
reserves.

The addition of capital accumulation to the model will

introduce possible precautionary motives in investment.
The costs of default penalization also provide a precautionary
motive for reserve-holding for the same reason in the same framework.
The cost of accumulating some reserves ex ante may be offset by the
reduction in the likelihood of default they facilitate.

Available

reserves allow continued debt-service with a smaller reduction in
current consumption, so that the benefits in low income events are
simultaneously increased consumption and reduction in the probability
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of facing default and consequent sanctions.

In the context of

borrowing and lending with imperfect information, reserves provide
insurance to allow continued debt-service payments during low income
events, so that the possible reputation costs of debt rescheduling
can be avoided.

Losses of reputation can lead to adverse shifts in

the supply of loans in any given future event.

These costs will also

offset the current opportunity cost of holding foreign reserves.
The discussion so far implies that an autonomous increase in the
reserves held by debtors during poor events will have a positive
impact on the probability of repayment and functioning of the
international credit market.

However, reserves may rise in

anticipation of repudiation, as was noted in section 3.

If default

sanctions include interference with access to trade finance, then
increasing foreign reserves reduces the cost of penalization, as long
as reserves cannot be confiscated by creditors.

The probability of

default may rise instead of fall because reserves are precautionary
savings against default sanctions.

4.6

8

Debtors' Reputations and Repeated Games of Incomplete
Information
A number of references have been made to the possible role of

borrowers' reputations in models that emphasize asymmetries of
information in the credit market.

Recent results in the theory of

games with incomplete information are likely to find widespread use
in theoretical models of international financial markets.

Aizenman

(1986) presents a variant of the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a)
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certainty model of lending with potential repudiation in which
creditors possess incomplete information about the perceptions of
debtors of the costs of penalties for default.

Lenders form beliefs

about borrowers' penalty cost perceptions which are summarized by a
probability distribution.

Debtors know the exact cost of sanctions.

Aizenrnan uses the model to generate an upward-sloping, then
backward-bending, supply curve of loans analogous to that derived
from a stochastic model (e.g. Figure 1).
Some insights might be gained by stating an explicit equilibrium
notion for this model.

The setup can be represented by an extensive

form game with incomplete information.

An appropriate equilibrium

concept is the sequential equilibrium one proposed by Kreps and
Wilson (1982b).

Multiple sequential equilibria exist for the model.

Restricting attention to those equilibria in which default never
occurs yields a potentially useful insight.

In such equilibria, loan

contracts are offered which provide non-negative expected profits
given lenders' prior beliefs about a debtor's perceived default
penalty, and equilibrium repayment obligations are less than the
actual penalty perceptions of debtors.

Even though repudiations

never occur in such sequential equilibria, creditors' beliefs are not
controverted.

However, updating priors may be inappropriate, because

extending more favorable loan terms may lead to a default.
Therefore, learning by creditors is costly.

Information which

adversely alters a debtor's reputation can have persistent effects.
An example of the applicability of games of incomplete
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information to the interpretation of international credit market
institutions is the existence of bond lending to LDCs along with
syndicated bank loans.
already been discussed.

The dominance of bank over bond lending has
However, a large number of medium and high

income LDCs have floated bonds on international markets since 1973,
and approximately $27 billion of bond debt is currently outstanding
(the bulk is Mexican and Brazilian).

Furthermore, during recent debt

rescheduling, interest payments on and amortization of bond debt
continued.

Bondholders have little option to declaring default if

payments are suspended; the prospect of repayment is already
reflected in the value of bonds on the secondary market.

Therefore,

lenders will hold bonds only if the borrower is inhibited from
defaulting on individual bonds.

An equilibrium with positive bond

debt under potential default is possible in a reputational game
because the ability to issue future bond debt depends upon
maintaining the servicing of existing bonds; the cost of a failure to
completely fulfill obligations to current bondholders is the loss of
any access to the bond market.

Moreover, the cost of defaulting on

bond obligations, however small, can lead to a loss of reputation in
all asset markets in a game of incomplete information, so that the
supply of bank loans is contracted or a default is declared by other
creditors.
Many of the characteristics of external lending to the LDCs
might find explanations in repeated games of incomplete information.
However, these games typically possess multiple equilibria, and the
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qualitative nature of equilibria often is very sensitive to the
particular assumptions made about the information possessed by
different players.

While some insights might be gained into the role

of debtors' and creditors' reputations in the market, the approach is
unlikely to yield empirically testable models.

Models based on the

characteristics of perfect equilibria in repeated stochastic games of
complete information which incorporate the enforceability problem are
difficult to handle but may be much more promising.
5.

Private Capital Flight and Public Debt
A widely publicized feature of large debtor countries is the

significant extent of the acquisition of foreign assets by their
citizens.

Using different methodologies, Dooley, gt~ al., (1983) and

Cuddington (1985) estimate that up to one half, and possibly more, of
the increase in the gross indebtedness of Argentina, Mexico, and
Venezuela during the period 1974-1982 was offset by private outflows
of capital.

Standard portfolio diversification can explain large

two-way flows.

If capital flight is a result of such motives, then

it is not the outcome of a market failure requiring intervention.
However, the imperfect enforceability of international debt contracts
provides a basis for concern.
In the presence of sovereign immunity, lenders may have little
ability to impose penalties on individual private debtors or assess
the value of their assets in the event of bankruptcy.

Creditors are

likely to have a greater ability to penalize the country as a whole
for default, so that capital inflows are in the form of loans to the
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government or to private borrowers with government guarantees.
The majority of lending to the LDCs has taken the form of public
or publicly-guaranteed debt.

In the absence of ex ante explicit

guarantees, governments have been held accountable by lenders for the
debts of private borrowers.

Diaz Alejandro (1985) gives an example

of the extent of implicit public guarantees of private debt.

The

Chilean government explicitly did not guarantee foreign loans to
several private banks.

However, when these banks failed, creditors

demanded and received repayment from the government.
Diaz Alejandro (1984) links capital flight from large Latin
American debtors to the subsidization and public guaranteeing of
private debt and the ability of nationals to avoid domestic taxation
of the income from foreign assets.

Eaton (1986) presents a model in

which capital flight can be generated by the tax obligations implied
by the potential nationalization of private debt.

Explicit and

implicit government guarantees create an interdependence between
private investment decisions through the public sector budget
constraint.

Actions which raise the probability of one borrower's

default increase the anticipated tax obligations of other borrowers.
The other borrowers have an incentive to place their assets abroad,
thereby increasing the probability of default on their own loans.
Multiple equilibria exist in each version of Eaton's model.

In

one of these, all creditors restrict loan amounts given debtors' tax
obligations, so that investing domestically and fully repaying debts
are in each borrower's self-interest.

Potential nationalization of
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private debts provides an incentive to borrowers to invest abroad,
raising the expected tax obligations of all borrowers.

Therefore,

another equilibrium exists in which all debtors invest abroad and the
government defaults on foreign debt.
A similar approach is taken in Eaton and Gersovitz (1986), in
which public borrowing is shown to lead to possible capital flight
because of the implied increases in the taxation of domestic
investment income with increased debt.

Khan and Haque (1985) model

capital flight as a response to an asymmetry in the risk of
expropriation facing domestic and foreign investors.

Nationals face

a higher risk of expropriation by their government, so they invest
abroad.
loans.

Consequently, domestic investment is financed with foreign
Using the Eaton and Gersovitz (1986) argument, the

governments expropriation decision can be related to public
indebtedness.

Expropriation and other forms of taxation are a means

for raising government revenue to meet external debt-service
obligations.

Increases in public debt contribute to the private

sector's anticipated taxation.

If assets located abroad escape

taxation and the risk of expropriation, then capital flight can be a
consequence of extensive foreign borrowing.
Much discussion of capital flight from Latin American debtors
has emphasized the role of overvalued currencies and domestic
financial instability.

Dornbusch (1985) points out that the threat

of devaluation in the presence of currency overvaluation is a primary
source of capital flight.

Inflationary finance, a form of taxation
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of domestic capital, can lead to capital flight as an application of
the analysis of Eaton (1986).
6.

Debtor Country Policies
The consequences of domestic policies for external borrowing are

a significant concern for countries facing imperfect international
credit access.

Debtor countries having repayment difficulties will

undertake policies intended to improve their current account
balances.

Furthermore, the option of defaulting introduces moral

hazard issues in the selection of domestic policy; part of the risk
of policy choices is borne by creditors.

Poor policy-making is cited

as a source of repayment difficulties, often because capital flight
is a perceived outcome.
The presence of a rising cost of external credit with
country-wide indebtedness implies that an optimal policy response is
to assure that the domestic rate of interest equals the marginal cost
of foreign credit rather than the average cost.

Aizenman (1986)

shows that this can be achieved through borrowing taxes if domestic
credit markets are not subject to imperfections.

If moral hazard,

adverse selection, or enforceability problems arise in domestic
credit transactions, then additional time-varying taxes and subsidies
are necessary.

Adoption of optimal taxes on foreign borrowing and

second-best commodity taxes and subsidies in the presence of domestic
market imperfections requires policymakers to possess complete
information on the external indebtedness of the country.

Recent

experience has shown that most large debtor nations have had a very
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limited account ing of public and publicly -guaran teed foreign
borrowin g.
The adoption of policies to improve the current account is
widespre ad, as is concern that liberali zation of trade can lead to
debt problem s.

Tariffs are widely thought to bring about current

account improvem ents because they raise the relative price of
importa bles.

In a general equilibr ium context, this is not

necessa rily the case.

The effect of tariffs on the excess of saving

over investm ent depends on their effects on the desired long-run
levels of physica l capital and wealth in the economy .

Engel and

Kletzer (1985b) show that permane nt tariff increase s have an
ambiguou s effect on the rate at which a country borrows from abroad;
the result depends crucial ly upon the particu lar formula tion of
househo ld objectiv es in an optimizi ng framewo rk.

Calvo (1986)

demonst rates that tempora ry liberali zation often leads to increasi ng
indebted ness because consume rs' intertem poral consump tion plans
anticipa te the future change in relative prices.

The implica tion is

that an intended permane nt liberali zation can lead to current account
deficits if househo lds perceive the possibi lity of future reversa l.
As a consequ ence, a reversa l of the plan can become optimal.

Calvo

proposes that borrowin g restrain ts accompan y trade liberali zation
program s.
A much less rigorou sly studied issue is debtor-o ptimal policy
choice under potenti al default.

If debtors are able to commit

themselv es to follow some policies over others, then improved loan
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terms will be forthcoming.

Commitment is essential, since increased

lending is accompanied by moral hazard problems when default is
possible.

The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in

policy choices suggests an important role for multilateral agencies
in the coordination of lending to the LDCs.

IMF conditionality can

be seen as potentially imposing commitment to policies from which a
debtor would optimally deviate ex post.

In the presence of creditor

imperfect information, IMF involvement may be essential to the terms
of loan contracts.

When lenders infer information about debtor

characteristics from other lenders' actions, IMF and World Bank
lending may play important roles in the formation of borrower
reputations.
7.

Creditor Country Regulation
Since the debt crises of 1982 began, a popular view in the

creditor nations has been that the banks lent too much.

Although

bankers may have made ex ante profitable loans which ex post they
would prefer not to have written, there is the possibility that
market imperfections lead to inefficient lending practices.

The

implications of basic models of lending with enforceability problems
is that credit is rationed and capital flows less than would occur if
potential sovereign default were not possible.
Kletzer (1984) discusses the potentially important inefficiency
in international lending which results when lenders are unable to
observe the magnitude of concurrent lending.

Since the lending of

each additional amount raises debt-service obligations, the
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probability of default on all outstanding debt increases.

Therefore,

in a rationing equilibrium the interest rate depends on the total
amount borrowed from all sources and not on the size of the
particular loan.

In the absence of observability of total concurrent

indebtedness, if an equilibrium exists, then more is lent at a higher
rate of interest than in an equilibrium with observability.
debtor is worse off as a result (see section 4).

The

Because seniority

clauses are less extensive and foreign loans are often made to a
variety of government agencies, public enterprises, and private
sector firms under government guarantee, the problem of observability
of total debt may be significant for international lending.

The

dissemination of information on the external private and official
debt of LDCs could be coordinated by the IMF and World Bank in an
effort to alleviate this type of international credit market
imperfection.
Because lenders have less information about their borrowers than
the debtors themselves or different information than do other
lenders, another informational externality arises.

Information about

the credit-worthine ss of borrowers can be inferred by the willingness
or lack thereof of other creditors to lend.

This externality could

contribute to panics by lenders, in which each lender's attempt to
protect themselves by withdrawing increases the likelihood others
will also, so that no one is able to recover their assets.

The

revision of a debtor's reputation induced by other lenders' cutbacks
can lead to a further reduction in the willingness to lend,

so

increasing the probability of default.
Public insurance of bank deposits is widespread in the developed
countries.

This insurance promotes capital market efficiency by

reducing the need for depositors to monitor bank activities or demand
large risk premia.

As a result of deposit insurance, banks have

incentives to increase the riskiness of their portfolios.

Bank

regulation accompanies insurance to restrain moral hazard on the part
of management.
The amount of bank capital lent to a single borrower is
restricted in the U.S.; however, countries or individual agencies in
countries were not classified as a single borrower.

Therefore, banks

could increase insurers' exposure to risk while raising expected
profits.
Regulators could take two steps to deter moral hazard problems.
The first is adopt full disclosure of lending to individual
countries.

Increased reporting (which has occurred in the U.S.) can

allow more extensive monitoring of banks portfolios by depositors and
shareholders and reduce the problems created by incomplete
observation of indebtedness by all lenders.
require bank capital increases.

The other step is to

The rescheduling of loans otherwise

in default allows banks to pay dividends on interest income created
by new loans.

This act can raise the upper bound on an insurance

claim arbitrarily high.
Compensation of bank managers can also create moral hazard
difficulties.

The performance of one banks' management is likely to
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be judged by that of other banks.

A manager who fails to undertake a

high-yield, high-risk loan which is repaid will suffer, while if all
banks make loans which fall into default, then any particular manager
is unlikely to be blamed.

This can lead to significant correlation

of risk between banks' portfolios.

Regulations restricting

management actions and increasing disclosure can partially offset the
adverse effects of these incentives.
8.

Empirical Implementation of Theories of Sovereign Borrowing
A number of econometric studies of LDC borrowing are available.

This section critically reviews the general approach of many of these
studies in terms of the theoretical analysis of sovereign lending.

A

comprehensive review of the empirical literature is not intended.
Existing econometric work investigates sovereign borrowing and
lending in two circumstances.

Several studies examine voluntary

lending and attempt to identify determinants of the level of debt and
the terms on which it was contracted.
when debt problems occur.

A second group concentrates on

The factors influencing a resumption of

voluntary lending to problem debtors have not been modelled.
Empirical implementation of theories of lending under sovereign
risk faces two basic problems.

Information on the terms of loans is

incomplete; studies must use some level of aggregation over loan
contracts.

Cumulative debt figures include public foreign debt and

private debt covered by varying degrees of government guarantee,
explicit or implicit.

Another problem is the absence of suitable

exogenous variables which vary across debtors.

The terms of trade
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are an important source of external disturban ces which may be treated
as roughly exogenous for many LDCs; however, few other variables
exist.

A primary problem with much of the extant empirical

literatur e is the inclusion of variables endogenou s to external
capital flows as explanato ry variables .
Estimatio n of the determina nts of outstandi ng debt and voluntary
credit flows requires allowing for the possibili ty that desired debt
levels exceed a creditor imposed debt ceiling.

In the absence of

repayment problems, two regime models must be used.

With problem

debtors in the sample, three (or more) regimes are necessary to allow
for both voluntary and involunta ry lending.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1980 and 1981a) estimated a two-regim e
version of their model using data from forty-fiv e countries for the
two years 1970 and 1974.

They find that the credit-co nstrained

regime is more prevalent than the unconstra ined one.

Hajivassi liou

(1985) estimates a three-regi me model using a panel set of data for
seventy-n ine countries over the period 1970-1982 .

By accountin g for

unobserve d heterogen eity across debtors, persisten t country effects
are found over time.
Bank loans to the LDCs typically specify the interest rate as
the sum of a reference rate, usually the London Inter-Ban k Offer
Rate, and a spread.

The spread is fixed for the term of the loan,

while the reference rate floats.

As noted in section 4, the quantity

lent and repayment terms are jointly determine d.

In a stochasti c

setting, the interest spread is endogenou s to the same set of
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variable s that determin e quantity (in the certaint y version of the
Eaton-G ersovitz model, the spread is zero).
treat the rate as exogeno us.

However, several studies

An alternat ive econome tric approach to

that taken by all authors would be simultan eous estimati on of the
spread and amount lent; however , such an exercise may require
extensiv e individu al loan data rather than the aggrega ted loan data
availab le to these authors.

Hajivas siliou (1985) cites evidence that

interes t spreads are not responsi ve to the same variable s which
determin e credit inflows.

More complete informa tion on loan terms is

necessa ry to adequate ly test for exogene ity.

In particu lar, interes t

payment s do not comprise the full return to lenders, for example ,
front-en d fees are widespre ad in sovereig n lending.
Interes t spreads reflect the riskines s of loans but are not
strictly risk premia, because the amount lent is rationed and also
reflects lenders' percepti ons of risk.

McDonald (1982) surveys a

number of studies which attempt to interpre t the spread as a risk
premium .

In addition to poorly revealin g credito rs' risk

assessm ents, spreads should reflect other factors, such as differin g
tax treatmen t of interest income across borrowe rs.

These studies use

a number of explana tory variable s the inclusio n of which is not
derived from a well-sta ted model of sovereig n lending.

For example ,

while the maturity of debt is not exogenou s to the other terms of
loan contrac ts, the term structur e of debt is often included as an
indepen dent variable .
A large number of econome tric studies of LDC borrowin g
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concentrate on debtor nations which experienced debt-servicing
difficulties.
papers.

McDonald (1982) provides a review of a number of these

McFadden, et. al., (1985) adopts a multi-regime model which

emphasizes borrowers falling first into arrears and then possibly
rescheduling.

Events are analyzed rather than credit flows.

The use

of the occurrence of a debt problem as a dependent variable creates a
number of difficulties: debt problems are hard to define.

Because

the formal declaration of a default can be costly to lenders, some
debtors experiencing debt-servicing problems may not be identified.
Borrowers may not choose to explicitly repudiate so that penalties
are delayed and reduced.

Rescheduling of some loans may not reduce

the present-value of the debt, while in other cases, it will.

The

adoption of the event of rescheduling as a dependent variable does
not allow for a distinction between these instances.

Of primary

interest in debt-servicing problem cases are the determinants of the
future flows of capital.

The study by Hajivassiliou (1985) which

includes incidences of repayment problems in an analysis of the
determinants of the flows of funds is a step in this direction.
Edwards (1984) also analyzes problem debtors.

The interest

spread is selected for the dependent variable, while the amount lent
is used as an independent variable.

As in many other papers, Edwards

uses explanatory variables which are likely to be jointed determined
with the dependent variable, for example, international reserves to
GNP ratio, capital inflow to debt-service ratio, and investment to
GNP ratio.
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9.

Conclusio n
This paper has attempted to survey ideas developed in the

literatur e on the role of sovereign immunity in internati onal capital
markets.

A number of implicati ons of the enforceme nt problems and

informati onal imperfect ions in internati onal credit markets for the
nature of capital flows to the LDCs have been discussed ; many of
these have not yet been modelled rigorousl y.

The relations hip

between sovereign immunity and debtor country macroecon omic policy
choices and the role of multilate ral agency and official lending for
coordinat ing capital flows have received sparse attention in the
theoretic al literatur e.

Many of the economet ric studies of sovereign

borrowing have not taken account of the theoretic al analysis and fai~
to recognize the simultane ity of the determina tion of dependent and
explanato ry variables .

The inadequac y of data on private sector

loans and difficult ies for defining problem cases hamper the best
efforts.
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Footnote s
1.

For example , see Sachs (1984).

2. Fischer and Frenkel (1975) display stages in the balance of
payment s in a non-opt imizing model with a fixed saving rate. The
results of Engel and Kletzer (1985a) are derived in a small
country model with endogeno us time preferen ce, but they clearly
general ize to other saving formula tions and to a two-cou ntry
framewo rk.
3.

See Eaton, Gersovi tz and Stiglitz (1986).

4. Arnott and Stiglitz (1982) discuss the importan ce of
observa bility of total insuranc e purchase s in moral hazard models
at length. The comparis on between credit market equilib ria with
and without observa bility in Kletzer (1984) draws on this paper
extensiv ely.
5. This type of equilibr ium credit-r ationing contras ts with that
derived by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Here (and in Jaffee and
Russell (1976)) each borrowe r receives a loan smaller than what
they demand at the equilibr ium rate of interest . In the
Stiglitz -Weiss adverse selectio n model, some borrowe rs' projects
are fully-fu nded and other potenti al borrowe rs receive no funds
even though they demand them at the equilibr ium rate of interes t.
6. For example, see McFadde n, et. at., (1985) and Edwards
(1984).
7.

See Kletzer (1984) and, also, Gale and Hellwig (1985).

8. O'Conne ll (1986) discusse s these issues in a bargain ing game
with incompl ete informa tion.

57

Referenc es
Aizenma n,J. (1986), "Country Risk, Asymme tric Informa tion and
Domesti c Policies ," NBER Working Paper Series, No. 1880, April.
Alexand er, L.S. (1985), "Trade and Sovereig n Lending ," Federal
Reserve Board of Governo rs, manuscr ipt.
Arnott, R. and J.E. Stiglitz (1982) "Equilib rium in Competi tve
Insuranc e Markets: The Welfare Economi cs of Moral Hazard,"
Queen's Univers ity Institut e of Economic Research , Discuss ion
Paper No. 465.
Avramov ic D., et. al., (1964) Economic Growth and Externa l Debt.
Baltimo re: Johns Hopkins Press.
Bardhan , P.K. (1967) "Optimum Foreign Borrowi ng," inK. Shell, ed.,
Essays on the Theory of Optimal Economic Growth. Cambrid ge, MA.:
MIT Press, 117-128.
Calvo, G. (1985) "On the Costs of Tempora ry
Liberal ization/ Stabiliz ation Experim ents," Columbia Univers ity
Departm ent of Economi cs, mimeo, Septemb er
Clarida , R. (1986) "Interna tional Lending and Borrowin g in a
Stochas tic Sequence Equilibr ium," NBER Working Paper Series, No.
1944, June.
Cooper, R. and J.D. Sachs (1985) "Borrow ing Abroad: The Debtor's
Perspec tive," in Gordon W. Smith and John T. Cudding ton, ed.,
Interna tional Debt and the Develop ing Countrie s. Washing ton,
D.C.: IBRD, 21-60.
Cudding ton, J. (1985), "Capital Flight: Issues, Estimate s and
Explora tions," World Bank, unpublis hed.
Diamond , D. and P. Dybvig (1983) "Bank Runs, Deposit Insuranc e, and
Liquidi ty," Journal of Politica l Economy, 91, 401-409.
Diaz-Al ejandro, C. (1984)," Latin American Debt: I Don't Thnk We are
in Kansas Anymore ," Brooking s Papers on Economic Activity , 2,
335-403 .
Diaz-Al ejandro, C. (1984), "Good-by e Financi al Repressi on, Hello
Financi al Crash," Journal of Developm ent Economi cs, 19, 1-24.
Domar, E. (1950)," The Effects of Investm ent on the Balance of
Payment s," American Economic Review, 40, 805-826.

58

Dooley, M. et., al., (1983), "An Analysis of the External Debt
Positions of Eight Developing Countries through 1990," Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, International Finance Discussion
Paper, No. 227.
Dornbusch, R. (1985), "External Debt, Budget Deficits, and
Disequilibrium Exchange Rates," in G. Smith and J. Cuddington,
eds., International Debt and the Developing Countries.
Washington, D.C.: IBRD.
Eaton, J. (1985) "Lending with Costly Enforcement of Repayment and
Potential Fraud, "Department of Economics, University of
Virginia, mimeo.
Eaton, J. (1986), "Public Debt Guarantees and Private Capital
Flight," World Bank, Development Research Department, rnimeo,
August.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1980) "LDC Participation in
International Financial Markets: Debt and Reserves," Journal of
Development Economics, 7, 3-21.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981a) "Debt with Potential Repudiation:
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies,
48, 289-309.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981b) Poor Country Borrowing and the
Repudiation Issue, Princeton N.J.: Princeton Studies in
International Finance, No. 4.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz, (1986), "Country Risk and the
Organization of International Capital Transfer," World Bank,
Development Research Department, mimeo, August.
Eaton, J., M. Gersovitz, and J.E. Stiglitz (1986) "The Pure Theory
of Country Risk," European Economic Review, 30, 481-513.
Edwards, S. (1984) "LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An
Empirical Investigation, 1976-80," American Economic Review, 74,
726-734.
Engel, C. and K. Kletzer (1985a) "International Borrowing to Finance
Investment," Yale University, Economic Growth Center Discussion
Paper Series, No. 469, February.
Engel, C. and K. Kletzer (1985b) "Tariffs, Savings and the Current
Account," Yale University, Economic Growth Center Discussion
Paper Series, No. 477, December.
Fischer, S. and J. Frenkel (1974) "Economic Growth and the Stages in
the Balance of Payments," in G. Horwich and P. Samuelson, eds.,

59

Trade, Stability , and Macroecon omics. New York: Academic Press.
Fudenberg , D. and E. Maskin (1986) "The Folk Theorem in Repeated
Games with Discounti ng and with Incomplet e Informati on,"
Economet rica, 50, 863-894.
Gale, D. and M. Hellwig (1985) "Incentive -Compati ble Debt Contracts :
The One-Perio d Problem," Review of Economic Studies, 52,
647-663.
Gersovitz , M. (1983) "Trade, Capital Mobility and Sovereign
Immunity, " Research Program in Developme nt Studies Discussio n
Paper No. 108, Princeton Universit y, September .
Gersovitz , M. (1985) "Banks' Internati onal Lending Decisions : What
we know and implicatio ns for future research, " in G. Smith and
J. Cuddingto n, eds., Internati onal Debt and the Developin g
Countries . Washingto n, D.C.: IBRD, 61-78.
Grossman, H. and J.B. Van Huyck (1985) "Sovereig n Debt as a
Contingen t Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiati on, and
Reputatio n," Brown Universit y, mimeo.
Hajivass iliou, V. (1985) "Analyzin g the Determina nts of the External
Debt Repaymen ts Problems of LDCs: Economet ric Modelling using a
Panel Set of Data," Yale Universit y, Economic Growth Center
Discussio n Paper Series, No. 495, December.
Hamada, K (1966) "Economic Growth and Long-Term Internati onal
Capital Movement s," Yale Economic Essays, 6, 41-96.
Hellwig, M. (1977) " A Model of Borrowing and Lending with
Bankruptc y," Economet rica, 45, 1879-1906 .
Jaffee, D. and F. Modiglian i (1969) "A Theory and Test of Credit
Rationing ," American Economic Review, 59, 850-872.
Jaffee, D. and T. Russell (1976) "Imperfec t Informati on, Uncertain ty
and Credit Rationing ," Quarterly Journal of Economics , 90,
651-666.
Kaletsky, A. (1985) The Costs of Default. New York: Priority Press.
Khan, M.S. and N. Hague, (1985) "Foreign Borrowing and Capital
Flight: A Formal Analysis, " IMF Staff Papers, 32, 606-628.
Kharas, H. (1984) "The Long-Run Creditwo rthiness of Developin g
Countries : Theory and Practice, " Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
99, 415-439.
Kletzer, K. (1984) "Asymmet ries of Informati on and LDC Borrowing

60

with Sover eign Risk, " Econo mic Journ al, 94, 287-3 07.
Kreps , D.M. and R. Wilso n (1982 ) "Sequ ential Equil ibria,
"
Econo metric a, 50, 863-8 94.
Krugman, P. (1985 ) "Inte rnatio nal Debt Proble ms in an
Unce rtain
World ," in G. Smith and J. Cuddi ngton , eds., Inter natio
nal Debt
and the Devel oping Coun tries. Washi ngton , D.C.: IBRD,
79-10 0.
McDo nald, C.D. (1982 ), "Debt Capac ity and Devel oping
Count ry
Borro wing: A Surve y of the Liter ature ," IMF Staff Paper
s, 29,
603-6 46.
McFad den, D. et. al., (1985 ) "ls There Life After Debt?
An
Econo metric Analy sis of the Credi twort hines s of Devel
oping
Coun tries, " in G. Smith and J. Cuddi ngton , eds., Inter
natio nal
Debt and the Devel oping Coun tries. Washi ngton , D.C.:
IBRD,
179-2 09.
O'Con nell, S.A. (1986 ) "Rese rves and Debt in LDCs," Univ
ersity of
Penns ylvan ia Depar tment of Econo mics, mimeo, March .
Ozler , S. (1984 ) "Resc hedul ing of Sover eign Gover nment
Bank Debt, "
Stanf ord Univ ersity , mimeo.
Sachs , J. (1984 ) Theo retica l Issue s in Inter natio nal
Borro wing,
Princ eton, N.J.: Princ eton Studi es in Inter natio nal Finan
ce, No.
54.
Sachs , J. and D. Cohen (1985 ) "LDC Borro wing with Defau
lt Risk, "
Kredi t und Kapit al, speci al issue .
Stigl itz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1981 ) "Cred it Ratio ning
in Marke ts with
Imper fect Inform ation, " Ameri can Economic Review , 71,
393-4 11.
Stigl itz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1983 ) "Ince ntive Effec ts
of
Term inatio ns," Ameri can Econo mic Review , 73, 912-9 27.
Towns end, R. (1978 ) "Optim al Contr acts and Comp etitive
Marke ts with
Costl y State Verif icatio ns," Journ al of Economic Theor
y, 21,
417-4 25.

